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Abstract: Like many international tribunals, the International Court of Justice
subscribes heavily to the principle of free admissibility of evidence. Neither its
statute nor rules impose substantive restrictions on the admissibility of evi-
dence, whether by way of exclusionary rules or an exclusionary discretion.
Instead, the court’s practice has been to focus on evaluating and weighing the
evidence after it has been admitted. There are certainly features of the ICJ that
sets it apart from domestic courts and arguably justify such an approach: the ICJ
is for settling disputes between sovereign states; it does not use a typical fact-
finding system; its rules and practices reflect a mix of civil and common law
traditions; and traditional exclusionary rules were not conceived with inter-state
dispute resolution in mind. Yet for any judgment to have legitimacy, the evi-
dential foundations must be strong and there should be a coherent and prin-
cipled mechanism to sieve out problematic evidence at an early stage. Having
this mechanism can also ensure that resources are not wasted and rights
protected. Through an examination of the court’s rules and jurisprudence and
the rules and practices of other international tribunals, this article makes the
case for the codification of a provision that gives the ICJ an exclusionary
discretion.
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1 Overview
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations (UN),1 an intergovernmental organisation which today has close
to 200 member states.2 The court’s primary responsibility is to decide inter-state
disputes which it has jurisdiction over.3 Judgments by the court, or any of its
chambers,4 are binding upon the parties before it; if a party fails to perform
obligations under a judgment, the other party may have recourse to the UN
Security Council, which may recommend measures to be taken to give effect to
the judgment.5 Since its work began in 1946, the ICJ has delivered more than a
hundred judgments, and its caseload has also been growing steadily in the last
couple of decades.6 Litigation before the ICJ is increasingly seen by states as a
viable dispute resolution option.7
Despite the broad range of subject matter that the court may assume
jurisdiction over,8 the ICJ statute makes it clear that the court is obligated to
decide cases only in accordance with existing international law, which in turn is
derived primarily from the rules found in international conventions or treaties,
international custom, and general principles of law recognised by civilised
nations.9 The content of substantive public international law, insofar as what
the court is bound to apply, is thus discernible.
On matters of evidence, however, there has never been much useful gui-
dance for the ICJ or from the ICJ, despite the court taking on an increasingly
1 Statute of the International Court of Justice (18 April 1946) TS 993, art. 1.
2 See http://www.un.org/en/member-states/.
3 Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 1, arts. 34 and 36. The court also
renders advisory opinions occasionally, in which the parties need not necessarily be states.
4 The ICJ generally listens to cases as a full court, but it may also form temporary or permanent
chambers for certain types of cases: see, for instance, Statute of the International Court of
Justice, id., arts. 26 and 29.
5 Charter of the United Nations (24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, art. 94.
6 See http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1 = 3&p2= 2&lang= en. As of 2016, it has
around a dozen cases pending: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1 = 3&p2 = 1. The pre-
decessor to the ICJ, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), heard 29 contentious
cases and delivered 27 advisory opinions between 1922 and 1940: http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/
index.php?p1 = 9.
7 Robert Kolb, The International Court of Justice (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013), 1155–1162.
8 See Rosalyn Higgins, “Departing Thoughts on the International Court of Justice”, Proceedings
of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 103 (2009): 408, 410–411.
9 Statute of the International Court of Justice supra note 1, art. 38. The same article states that
the court “shall apply… judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”
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diverse array of cases that involve increasingly complex questions of fact.10
Indeed, as noted by Judge Owada in Oil Platforms, the general lack of clear
rules of evidence for the court, combined with the court’s seeming aversion to
being proactive in regulating the reception of evidence, can cast serious doubts
on the legal and factual foundations of decisions rendered by the ICJ.11 Given the
upward trend of parties submitting voluminous amounts of evidence to the
court,12 one may rightly be concerned that the court “has not found the need
to articulate its evidence policy in many cases.”13
This article investigates one particular aspect of the ICJ’s approach towards
evidence that may warrant reform. Specifically, there is still no concrete frame-
work for the court to answer questions relating to the admissibility and exclu-
sion of evidence; more specifically, there are essentially no express exclusionary
rules to filter problematic evidence from the outset, and the court also has no
obvious discretion to exclude evidence but can only give evidence it has issues
with little or no weight after it has been admitted.14 The purpose of this article is
to ask why, and whether something can and should be done about it.15 To this
end, this article is divided into two main parts.
10 See generally Peter Tomka and Vincent-Joël Proulx, “The Evidentiary Practice of the World
Court” in Liber Amicorum Gudmundur Eiriksson, edited by Juan Carlos Sainz-Borgo. San Jose:
University for Peace Press, 2016. See also Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay),
Judgment, ICJ Reports 2010, 14.
11 (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2003, 161,
319–323.
12 Anna Riddell and Brendan Plant, Evidence Before the International Court of Justice (London:
British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2009), 159; Juan José Quintana,
Litigation at the International Court of Justice (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 382–387.
13 Michael Scharf and Margaux Day, “The International Court of Justice’s Treatment of
Circumstantial Evidence and Adverse Inferences”, Chicago Journal of International Law 13(1)
(2012): 123, 125.
14 While it is recognised that the ICJ has “discretionary authority to refuse to accept evidence
offered” (see Durward Sandifer, Evidence Before International Tribunals (Virginia: University
Press of Virginia, 1975), 184–185), on the few occasions the ICJ (and the PCIJ), exercised such
discretion, it did not delve into how it would exercise its discretion to exclude evidence in the
future – except that it would do so in the immediate case: see Jurisdiction of the European
Commission of the Danube between Galatz and Braila (1927) PCIJ Series B, No 14, 32; Case
Concerning the Factory at Chorzow (1928) PCIJ Series A, No 17, 51; Case Concerning the Frontier
Dispute (Burkina Faso v Republic of Mali), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, 632.
15 The relevant academic literature thus far does not appear to have covered this particular
topic in great detail (though there have been writings on evidence in international adjudication
generally, the ICJ’s general approach to fact-finding, and the ICJ’s treatment of particular types
of evidence). This topic also gained prominence for probably the first time in Jessup moot court
history in 2015–16, when it was one of the main issues presented as a prayer in the compromis.
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The first part (Section 2) focuses on examining the existing, but relatively
limited, rules that govern the admissibility and exclusion of evidence in matters
before the ICJ. These rules find expression to varying degrees in the court’s
statute, practice directions, and rules of court, as well as the court’s jurispru-
dence. The first part of the article further considers the possible explanations for
the limitedness of the rules, and also examines the rules and practices of other
types of international tribunals that have attempted to exert some control over
the admissibility and exclusion of evidence. In so doing, it identifies various
gaps in the current evidentiary regime of the ICJ.
The second part of this article (Section 3) builds on the first. It considers,
notwithstanding the virtual absence of exclusionary rules, the plausibility of
codifying a provision that would delineate the scope of the ICJ’s exclusionary
discretion. It attempts to make the case that even though the court can justifi-
ably be said to be sui generis and its existing evidentiary regime of liberal
admissibility can be rationalised, elucidating how the court should exercise its
authority to reject evidence would help enhance its legitimacy and protect the
rights of states – rectitude of decision should not be its only goal. It then
proposes how such a provision can be formulated, before proceeding to justify
and lay out the considerations behind this proposal.
2 The existing framework for admissibility
and exclusion of evidence
As mentioned, we begin by considering the existing legal framework for the
admissibility and exclusion of evidence in proceedings before the ICJ. At this
point one is confronted with an imperative threshold question: What sort of
evidence exactly might qualify for non-admissibility or exclusion in the first
place – would one work from, say, traditional exclusionary grounds in the
common law such as hearsay and illegally obtained evidence? Indeed, this
question would have justified the commencement of our survey with the rele-
vant case law, before turning to the primary sources of law in the form of the
court’s statute, rules, and practice directions. This is because the court’s deci-
sions (as well as that of other related international tribunals) would have been
very useful in immediately illustrating how international litigation has given rise
to various situations in which certain types of evidence should have been denied
admissibility or excluded at an early stage, but without a clear framework for
admissibility and exclusion, it was difficult for the court (that is, the ICJ) to
establish the precise legal premises for how the evidence should have been
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treated. However, insofar as the ICJ decisions to be discussed did make refer-
ences to the court’s rules, it would be clearer if the latter were properly set out
first before we turn to the jurisprudence of both the ICJ and other international
tribunals.
2.1 Statute, rules of court, and practice directions
2.1.1 ICJ Statute
The ICJ Statute comprises 70 articles, of which a handful pertain to evidence.
Perhaps the starting point of analysis is art. 30(1), which states that the court
“shall frame rules for carrying out its functions. In particular, it shall lay down
rules of procedure.”16 For our purposes, the question that arises at this juncture
is whether “rules of procedure” include “rules of evidence”, or whether a clear
demarcation is to be drawn between the two terms. This is important because if
a court can create its own rules of evidence, it would suggest that it may have
the discretion to exclude evidence.
A clue to the answer can be found in art. 51, which states that “During the
hearing any relevant questions are to be put to the witnesses and experts under
the conditions laid down by the Court in the rules of procedure referred to in art.
30”. This suggests that art. 30(1) is referring to procedure rather than evidence
strictly speaking, despite the provision’s express reference to relevance. But
even if art. 30(1) can be interpreted to include rules of evidence, art. 30(1) only
addresses the question of admissibility and exclusion in a very indirect way: the
rule only states that the court has the power to establish its own rules (of
evidence and procedure, if art. 30(1) is given the broad interpretation), but as
to what those rules are and how they can be applied, they are not elaborated
within the ICJ Statute itself.
The next most pertinent provision is probably art. 43(2), which states that
the written arguments presented to the court can consist of “all papers and
documents in support”. Parties are thus expected to submit written pleadings
and the relevant evidence at the same time. However, art. 43(2) specifies no
conditions of admissibility or grounds for exclusion for such evidence. The
remaining ICJ provisions that pertain to evidence also do not appear to address
the question of admissibility and exclusion, but point more towards the court
having control over its own proceedings.
16 See also Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (1924) PCIJ Series A, No 2, 16.
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These provisions include art. 48 (the court shall make all arrangements
connected with the taking of evidence),17 art. 49 (the court may call upon the
agents to produce any document),18 art. 52 (the court may refuse to accept further
oral or written evidence after it has received the proofs and evidence),19 art. 53(1)
(the court may rule in favour of the other party if a party does not appear before
the court), and art. 61(1) (a judgment may be revised if it is based upon the
discovery of a decisive fact that was unknown to the court when judgment was
given). Given what we have seen thus far, it cannot be said with great confidence
that the ICJ Statute addresses, or was meant to address, questions relating to the
admissibility or exclusion of evidence. It follows that it is also silent on whether
the court has the discretion to exclude evidence.
2.1.2 ICJ Rules of Court
The ICJ Statute, however, is to be read together with the court’s Rules of Court,20
which are “intended to supplement the general rules set forth in the [ICJ Statute]
and to make detailed provision for the steps to be taken to comply with them.”21
In fact, the Rules of Court were promulgated as a result of the court invoking
art. 30 of the ICJ Statute, but like the ICJ Statute, the Rules of Court do not
contain very comprehensive provisions on evidence, let alone provisions relat-
ing to the admissibility or exclusion of evidence.22 Here, it is apposite to briefly
return to the conundrum surrounding art. 30(1) of the ICJ Statute that was
sketched out above.
17 Another view (see Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, “Evidence Before the International Court of
Justice”, International Law Forum du Droit 1 (1999): 202) is that art. 48 is the starting point of
analysis in determining the court’s approach to matters of evidence, but perhaps it does not
really matter which is the true overarching provision (if there is even one). As will be shown, the
statute, rules of court, and practice directions of the ICJ simply offer little guidance on a crucial
issue of evidence law: admissibility and exclusion.
18 Cf Malcolm Shaw, International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 789: “[The ICJ]
has no power to compel production of evidence generally, nor may witnesses be subpoenaed,
nor is there any equivalent to proceedings for contempt of court.”
19 Art. 56 of the Rules of Court also empowers the court to receive new documentary evidence
after the closure of written proceedings; this article is elaborated upon in the next section.
20 ICJ Rules of Court (1978). The rules were last amended in 2005.
21 http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=3&.
22 Markus Benzing, “Evidentiary Issues” in The Statute of the International Court of Justice:
A Commentary, edited by Andreas Zimmermann, Karin Oellers-Frahm, Christian Tomuschat,
and Christian Tams, 1236–1238. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
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Specifically, art. 31 of the Rules of Court states: “In every case submitted to
the Court, the President shall ascertain the views of the parties with regard to
questions of procedure.” Art. 31 is cross-referenced in three other provisions in
the Rules of Court, but while two of them have nothing to do with evidence,23
one of them potentially goes towards the admissibility and exclusion of evidence
(and therefore suggests that the phrase “rules of procedure” in art. 30(1) of the
ICJ Statute includes rules of evidence): Art. 58(2) states that the “the method of
handling the evidence and of examining any witnesses and experts … shall be
settled by the Court after the views of the parties have been ascertained in
accordance with [art. 31 of the Rules of Court].”
One way to interpret art. 58(2) – and the phrase “method of handling the
evidence” in particular – is that the court takes a fairly permissive approach to
the regulation of evidence generally, and even does so in consultation with the
parties. This permissive approach is seen as well in art. 57, which states that
“each party shall communicate to the Registrar, in sufficient time before the
opening of the oral proceedings, information regarding any evidence which it
intends to produce or which it intends to request the Court to obtain”, and that
this communication is to contain details of “the witnesses and experts whom the
party intends to call, with indications in general terms of the point or points to
which their evidence will be directed.”24 In other words, the parties are only
required to inform the court ahead of time as to the evidence that will be put
forth as a formality, but are otherwise given considerable latitude in preparing
the evidentiary foundations of their respective cases.25 This is consistent with
what we saw in the ICJ Statute. But while the parties are given the freedom as
regards admissibility of evidence, there is nothing that speaks to the court’s
discretion to exclude it.
This is not to suggest, however, that the court has no say whatsoever once
the hearing has begun. Art. 56 allows a court to reject any request to submit
further documents if the written proceedings have closed – though if the
23 The provisions are art. 44(1) (the court can determine the number and order of the filing of
the pleadings and their time limits) and art. 44(1) (the applicability of art. 45, which concerns
the written procedure).
24 Art. 63 also allows the parties to call witnesses or experts whose names are not included in
the information given to the court, and arts. 67 and 68 round up the expert witness provisions,
the details of which need not concern us here.
25 See also art. 49, which requires each memorial to contain a statement of the relevant facts
and each counter-memorial to contain an admission or denial of those facts, and art. 50, which
requires the annexure of any relevant documents that support the contentions in the memorials.
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opposing party consents, the court is unlikely to intervene.26 The same article
also states that no reference “may be made during the oral proceedings to
the contents of any document which has not been produced”.27 Then there is
art. 62(1), which states that the court can “call upon the parties to produce such
evidence or to give such explanations as the Court may consider to be necessary
for the elucidation of any aspect of the matters in issue”.28 This is in furtherance
of its powers under art. 61 to “indicate any points or issues to which it would like
the parties specially to address” and to “put questions to the agents”.29 Finally,
there is art. 66, which empowers the court – after consultation with the parties –
to make orders concerning the “obtaining of evidence at a place or locality to
which the case relates”.30
In summary, despite the more comprehensive treatment of issues of evi-
dence, the Rules of Court do not really go any further than the ICJ Statute when
it comes to questions of admissibility or exclusion. The Rules of Court only
confirm that the court prefers to deal with evidence after it has been admitted.
2.1.3 ICJ Practice Directions
For completeness, the Practice Directions of the ICJ should also be considered.31
The Practice Directions were first adopted in 2001 for use by states appearing
26 For instance, in The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (France v United Kingdom), Judgment, ICJ
Reports 1953, 47, both parties had filed evidence after written proceedings closed, but since
neither party objected to the other party’s production, the evidence were successfully admitted.
Art. 56 also states that in the absence of consent, the court may authorise the production of the
documents after it has heard the parties; further, the opposing party is entitled to comment on
the new documents and submit its own new documents in support of its comments.
27 The exception is if the document is “part of a publication readily available”. In Anglo-Iranian
Oil Co Case (United Kingdom v Iran), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1952, 93, the court was firm in
stating that documents that were filed late and not in accordance with procedure could not be
produced or referred to.
28 This power has only been invoked once in the recent history of the ICJ: Litigation at the
International Court of Justice, supra note 12, at 424.
29 Under art. 65, the court may also put questions to the witnesses, and under art. 64, the
witnesses are put on oath to tell the truth before giving evidence.
30 This article was invoked for the first time in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/
Slovakia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1997, 7. There, the court made a site visit to a hydroelectric
dam between the first and second round of oral pleadings, and the court were able to put
questions of fact to both parties after being given technical explanations by the states’ advisors.
31 ICJ Practice Directions (2001). The Practice Directions were last amended in 2013.
8 S. Chen
before the ICJ.32 They are fairly brief, and also do not directly address matters
relating to admissibility or exclusion. Instead, they appear designed to remind
parties of the practices that are expected to be adopted at various points of the
proceedings, and were somewhat intended as a check against parties submitting
evidence in a tardy fashion.33
The most pertinent provisions for present purposes are:34 Practice Direction
III, which states that parties should avoid the “excessive tendency towards the
proliferation and protraction of annexes to written pleadings”;35 Practice
Direction IX(2), which states that a party seeking to submit new documents
after the closure of the written proceedings “shall explain why it considers it
necessary … and shall indicate the reasons preventing the production of the
document at an earlier stage”;36 Practice Direction IXbis, which in the main
stipulates guidelines for documents that are submitted after the close of written
proceedings and claimed to be “part of a publication readily available”; and
Practice Direction IXquater, which stipulates guidelines for the presentation of
audio-visual or photographic material at the hearings.
It should be noted that the Statute, Rules of Court, and Practice Directions
of the ICJ do not explicitly state the consequences for non-compliance.
Presumably, if there is any evidence that do not conform with the procedures
and guidelines set out, the court has the power to reject such evidence.
However, rejection of evidence on these grounds would be based on a breach
of procedure and formality, rather than for reasons relating to unreliability or
normative, non-epistemic considerations.
2.1.4 Preliminary observations on the ICJ’s rules of evidence
Before we turn to consider the jurisprudence, it may be helpful to take stock of
what we have seen thus far. The ICJ Statute, its Rules of Court, and its Practice
Directions all confirm that while the ICJ does have control over its own process
32 The Practice Directions are only meant to supplement, and not alter, the Rules of Court:
http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1 = 4&p2= 4&p3=0.
33 “Departing Thoughts on the International Court of Justice”, supra note 8, at 408–410. See
also Evidence Before the International Court of Justice, supra note 12, at 25.
34 Interestingly, Practice Direction XIII cross-references to art. 31 of the Rules of Court – the
article which, as seen earlier, potentially allows the court to set its own rules on evidence – but
it sheds no light whatsoever as to what the phrase “questions of procedure” entails.
35 This is also reiterated in Practice Direction IXter.
36 See also art. 56 of the Rules of Court, which was referenced earlier.
Re-assessing the Evidentiary Regime of the ICJ 9
and can take initiatives to satisfy itself that there is sufficient evidence and that
there is equality of arms between the parties, none of these sources of law say
anything about when evidence should be inadmissible or should be excluded.37
It is hardly an exaggeration to state that it is often completely up to the parties to
determine what is relevant and admissible,38 given that there are no express
rules that render any evidence inadmissible on substantive grounds (as opposed
to the non-compliance with the procedural requirements on how the evidence is
to be submitted, such as timely filing).39 In addition, if a party does not object to
facts submitted by the opposing party in the written submissions, the evidence is
effectively considered admitted, though the court is free to decide the weight of
any admitted piece of evidence.40 All of this points to the ICJ subscribing to the
principle of free admissibility. But the question that recurs, and that remains
unresolved, is: on what grounds can the evidence even be challenged at the
admissibility stage?
That is the precise purpose of this article, but for the moment, one explana-
tion given for this “liberal evidentiary regime” is that “the Court appears to have
been influenced primarily by continental legal systems, with written evidence
more common than oral evidence” even though “there is no true hierarchy of
different forms of evidence before the Court.”41 Related to this is the historical
37 See also Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court (Leiden: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1985), 557, who claims that “the restrictions upon admissibility of evidence sometimes
encountered in national procedure have no place in international adjudication, where the
relevance of facts and the value of evidence tending to establish facts are left to the entire
appreciation of the court.”
38 See also Evidence Before International Tribunals, supra note 14, at 189: “admission is a
matter of right, and the burden is upon the party challenging any piece of evidence to show that
the particular procedural law of the tribunal will be violated by a refusal to exclude it.”
39 Rüdiger Wolfrum and Mirka Moldner, “International Courts and Tribunals, Evidence” in
Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, [58]. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013. See also Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v United States of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, 14, 26 and 40: “the
presentation of pleadings and evidence are designed to secure a proper administration of
justice, and a fair and equal opportunity for each party to comment on its opponent’s conten-
tion… The presentation of evidence is governed by specific rules relating to… the observance of
time-limits, the communication of evidence to the other party, the submission of observations
on it by that party, and the various forms of challenge by each party of the other’s evidence”.
40 “International Courts and Tribunals, Evidence”, id. at [61].
41 “Evidence Before the International Court of Justice”, supra note 17, at 204. See also Michael
Reisman and Eric Freedman, “The Plaintiff’s Dilemma: Illegally Obtained Evidence and
Admissibility in International Adjudication”, American Journal of International Law 76 (1982):
737, 738–739.
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fact that the predecessor to the ICJ – the PCIJ, as well as many international
arbitral tribunals contemporaneous to it – had either given parties liberal
recourse to all types of evidence or parties seldom saw the need to object to
the admissibility of evidence, and this reinforced the impression that there were
virtually no barriers to the admissibility of evidence.42 Thus, while the court
system in adversarial in nature, the court’s approach towards the regulation of
evidence is more in line with civil traditions.43 This extreme flexibility was, and
still is, perceived to pose no problems especially in the context of the ICJ since
the court, which comprises highly trained legal professionals,44 is supposed to
be able to “ascertain the weight and relevance of particular evidence … [and are]
not considered to need ‘protection’ from potentially unreliable evidence.”45
Further, because “equality of the parties is the leading principle governing
inter-state litigation”, the concern of vulnerability of parties does not arise.46
Respect for the sovereign equality of the parties – and their consent to appear
before the ICJ – also means that states are given great latitude in how they
“express themselves on the relevant facts; the accuracy of facts within the
knowledge of the state concerned and submitted by it should not be ques-
tioned without good reason.”47 As a result, although the ICJ is given great
freedom to formulate its own rules of admissibility and exclusion, it exercises
this power sparingly given the context in which it finds itself in,48 choosing
instead to fall back on the safeguard of attributing weight to the full range of
evidence presented to it. However, a survey of the court’s jurisprudence would
expose a variety of cracks in adopting an overly liberal approach, to which we
now turn.
42 Evidence Before the International Court of Justice, supra note 12, at 70. This appears to be the
case for another tribunal that is closely related to the ICJ – the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea (ITLOS). Indeed, the ITLOS, being another judicial organ of the UN and another
court that presides over inter-state disputes, has almost the same rules of procedure and
evidence as the ICJ, and the proposals made here may be applicable to it as well.
43 “International Courts and Tribunals, Evidence”, supra note 39, at [2]–[3].
44 According to art 2. of the ICJ Statute, ICJ judges “must be elected from among persons of
high moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for
appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognised competence in
international law.”
45 “Evidence Before the International Court of Justice”, supra note 17, at 205.
46 “International Courts and Tribunals, Evidence”, supra note 39, at [5]–[6].
47 “International Courts and Tribunals, Evidence”, id. at [13]). See also The “Grand Prince”
(Belize v France), ITLOS Case No 8 (2001), [76]–[93].
48 See Chittharanjan Felix Amerasinghe, Evidence in International Litigation (Leiden: Brill,
2005), 163–166. See also Gleider Ignacio Hernandez, The International Court of Justice and the
Judicial Function (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 59.
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2.2 Jurisprudence of the ICJ and the rules and practices
of other international tribunals
Before proceeding, it should be noted that the decisions of both the PCIJ and ICJ
would be considered here. In discerning the evidentiary regime established by
the ICJ, it is necessary to trace the development of the jurisprudence to the PCIJ
as well, as the seeds of the current philosophy first took fruit in the decisions
handed down by the predecessor to the ICJ, and it would be artificial in light of
this to consider one court to the exclusion of the other.49 In addition, as one of
the aims of this article is to extract lessons from the rules and practices of other
international tribunals, where appropriate, their decisions would be considered
as well. The final preliminary point to be made is that the jurisprudence to be
examined is organised by categories of exclusion rather than chronology. This
makes it easier to identify the gaps in the court’s current framework for admit-
ting and excluding evidence.
2.2.1 Evidence from prior settlement negotiations
But our survey of the jurisprudence begins not with a gap in the current frame-
work of the ICJ but an anomaly: a ground of exclusion – and the only one it
appears50 – that has clearly been accepted by the court over the years. In many
domestic legal systems, it is common to prohibit the admissibility of evidence of
matters that transpired at settlement negotiations preceding the trial.51 The
49 Further, while ICJ cases do not have the force of stare decisis, the court has always relied on
its own jurisprudence in procedural and evidential questions: “Evidentiary Issues”, supra note
22, at 1237.
50 As mentioned earlier, although a court can reject evidence that is filed out of time (art. 56 of
the Rules of Court), this requires the evidence to be filed out of time first. If the evidence is not
filed out of time, then what might justify its exclusion if the rules (and jurisprudence) are
otherwise silent? For this reason, excluding evidence on the basis of its lateness – and the fact
that the reason of lateness is itself a procedural ground – cannot properly be described as
exclusion on a substantive ground, which is the main concern of this article. The same applies
to evidence that is rejected because it is not filed in accordance with art. 52 of the ICJ Statute (in
this regard see also Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (1932) PCIJ
Series A/B, No 46, 155).
51 See for instance s. 131 of Australia’s Evidence Act 1995, s. 57 of New Zealand’s Evidence Act
2006, or s. 23 of Singapore’s Evidence Act (which is replicated in all other Indian Evidence Act
jurisdictions), r. 408 of USA’s Federal Rules of Evidence. In terms of case law, see Canada’s
Sable Offshore Energy Inc v Ameron International Corp [2013] 2 SCR 623 and United Kingdom’s
Ofulue v Bossert [2009] 2 WLR 749.
12 S. Chen
rationales for this prohibition are inter-related and rooted in policy: settlement-
related evidence should be irrelevant or inadmissible as any settlement offers
made during such negotiations may be motivated by a desire to avoid acrimony
or costly legal battles, and therefore have nothing to do with the merits of the
claim; further, if evidence of settlement negotiations can used to prejudice a
party’s claim later on, parties would in all likelihood be inhibited from exploring
an amicable resolution to a dispute.52 This rule, as well as its rationales, has
been accepted by both the PCIJ and ICJ as a clear ground for not admitting
evidence.
The first case to recognise the rule appears to be Case Concerning the Factory
at Chorzow.53 In that case, there was a nitrate factory that was located in German
territory when it was first built. Following several uprisings in the region and
Polish independence, the said territory was awarded to Poland. Poland then
unilaterally transferred possession and management of the factory to a Polish
national. Germany and Poland had concluded a convention that regulation
expropriation, so Germany brought a claim on behalf of its aggrieved nationals
against Poland before the PCIJ. The court held that the convention was
breached.
For the purposes of deciding the quantum of compensation payable, the
court held that it could not “take into account declarations, admissions or
proposals which the Parties may have made during direct negotiations between
themselves, when such negotiations have not led to a complete agreement.”54
This position was reiterated by the ICJ in subsequent cases,55 such as the Case
Concerning the Frontier Dispute.56 The parties had submitted to the court an
agreement that related to a disputed frontier line and was negotiated by the
parties, but was not then approved by the competent authorities of each party.
The court cited Chorzow Factory to hold that this agreement could not be
accepted as evidence.57 A clear ground of inadmissibility or exclusion thus exists
by virtue of the ICJ’s jurisprudence.58
52 Jeffrey Pinsler, Evidence and the Litigation Process (Singapore: LexisNexis, 2015), 621–627.
53 (1927) PCIJ Series A, No 9.
54 Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow, id. at 51.
55 This position was also echoed in subsequent PCIJ cases, such as Case Relating to the
Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Order (1929) PCIJ Series A,
No 23, 42 and The Diversion of Water from the River Meuse (1937) PCIJ Series C, No 81, 220–224.
56 (Burkina Faso v Republic of Mali), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, 554.
57 Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute, id. at 632–633.
58 This ground of exclusion has also been accepted in the jurisprudence of other tribunals,
such as the Iran-US Claims Tribunal.
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2.2.2 Evidence obtained through forgery or falsification
Beyond the clearly established category of evidence obtained through prior
settlement negotiations, however, the ICJ has remained consistently and worry-
ingly ambivalent about exercising any exclusionary power even in the face of a
variety of problematic evidence being submitted to the court. One example is
that of forged or falsified evidence. In Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and
Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, the dispute was over the
sovereignty over certain islands, sovereign rights over certain shoals, and the
delimitation of a maritime boundary.59 Though the case was instituted in 1991
and fully decided in 2001, the disagreement between Qatar and Bahrain had
begun several decades prior.
One of the main points of disagreement was over the Hawar Islands, which
had attracted competing claims of sovereignty from Qatar and Bahrain since the
1930s. Back then, the sheikdoms of Qatar and Bahrain were British protectorates
supervised by a Political Resident based in Persia. For the decades that followed,
there were a number of significant communications and documents relating to
the ownership of the islands between the Political Resident, the British India
Office, and Political Agents deployed to the various sheikdoms. Protests, allega-
tions of illegal occupation, and failed negotiations eventually led Qatar to seek a
declaration of sovereignty over the islands from the ICJ.
In one set of Qatar’s written submissions to the court, there were more than
80 annexures comprising hitherto undisclosed diplomatic correspondence and
maps emanating from Bahraini officials that seemed to recognise Qatari sover-
eignty over the islands. Initially, Bahrain thought they were going to lose the
case because of the sudden appearance of such highly damaging evidence. But
after some forensic and historical analyses, Bahrain suspected that these docu-
ments were forged, and challenged the authenticity of these documents; it also
stated that it would disregard the content of those documents in the preparation
of its own memorial.
Despite a protracted series of communications with the court, Qatar con-
tinued to rely on the contents of the challenged documents, and Bahrain
requested the court to decide the question of the use of such documents as a
preliminary issue. The court ordered Qatar to file a specific and comprehensive
report on the issue of authenticity, and for Bahrain to file a reply accordingly.
Qatar ultimately decided that it would not rely on the disputed documents and
admitted that two of its own experts had questioned the authenticity of the
documents. It also claimed that it was no longer relying on the documents as it
59 (Qatar v Bahrain), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2001, 40.
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wanted to spare all the parties “procedural complications”.60 However, apart
from noting Qatar’s eventual non-reliance of the document in its written judg-
ment, the court did not say much more.61 One commentator expressed his
disagreement this way: “it might be opportune for further thought to be given
to the procedure that should be followed if it is alleged that false evidence has
been presented to the Court, as well as investigating the sanctions available”.62
In point of fact, this was not the first time that the ICJ was confronted with an
allegation of altered documents.63 In a previous case, the court chose not to say
anything as well, effectively treating those documents as non-existent.64
The presentation of falsified evidence, however, has also been a problem for
other international tribunals, but not all have responded the same way as the
ICJ. For instance, in The Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, the accused
person was charged in the International Criminal Court (ICC) with crimes against
humanity and war crimes.65 One of the issues was whether he had effectively
acted as a commander of certain rebels. To dispute this, he called 34 witnesses
to testify, but 14 of them were later found to have lied so as to aid his case.
Pursuant to art. 70 of the Rome Statute – which gives the court jurisdiction over
the offence of intentional presentation of false or forged evidence – a number of
these witnesses were arrested and charged.66 So while art. 70 is not a direct
means of excluding falsified or forged evidence, it at least serves as a deterrent
to prevent parties from submitting such evidence in the first place.
To cite further examples of international tribunals which have responded to
the issue of falsified or forged evidence, both the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) have in their
rules of procedure and evidence provisions that allow their courts to request
60 Maurice Mendelson, “The Curious Case of Qatar v Bahrain in the International Court of
Justice”, British Yearbook of International Law 72(1) (2001): 183, 200.
61 Judge Fortier did, however, express in a Separate Opinion that the documents infected the
entirety of Qatar’s case and could have jeopardised the legitimacy of the court. See also the
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel in Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and Against Nicaragua, supra note 39, at 259, where he opined that the case had turned on
fabricated testimony.
62 “The Curious Case of Qatar v Bahrain in the International Court of Justice”, supra note 60, at
200.
63 See Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI) (United States of America v Italy),
Judgment, ICJ Reports 1989, 15, 30.
64 Litigation at the International Court of Justice, supra note 12, at 429–430.
65 ICC-01/05-01/08.
66 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90. Art. 24(3) of the
Code of Professional Conduct (1 January 2006) also obligates counsel not to deceive or know-
ingly mislead the court.
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verifications of the authenticity of evidence.67 The ICC, ICTY, and ICTR all seem
to recognise that without either a penal sanction to deter forgery or a rule that
confirms that the court can compel parties to verify the authenticity of evidence,
the court can only rely on the good faith of parties (not to falsify evidence), the
professionalism of counsel (not to abet falsification), and the competence of
counsel (to be vigilant enough to detect forgery).68 In this respect, modern
international criminal tribunals have evolved from the position of
non-intervention adopted by older ones such as the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg.69 The rules they have put in place also complement
the ethical duties exhorted of counsel, such as those found in the 2010 Hague
Principles on Ethical Standards of Counsel Appearing Before International
Courts and Tribunals.70
2.2.3 Evidence obtained through a violation of law
At any rate, if the ICJ had kept silent in Maritime Delimitation because Qatar
ultimately gave up relying on the alleged forged documents and the documents
were never conclusively shown as forged, then the court’s reticence and inaction
in the face of evidence obtained under clearly illegal circumstances is more
difficult to explain, much less defend. In the Corfu Channel Case, the United
Kingdom carried out a mine-sweeping operation in the Corfu Channel against
the will of Albania.71 The United Kingdom argued that this intervention was
justified as it needed to secure possession of important evidence to present to an
67 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal of the Former
Yugoslavia UN Doc IT/32/Rev3, 30 January 1995, r. 89(E); Rules of Procedure and Evidence of
the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda UN Doc IT/3/Rev1, 29 June 1995, r. 89(D).
Another international tribunal which has responded differently from the ICJ is the Caribbean
Court of Justice, where in its Original Jurisdiction Rules 2015, it obligates counsel not to
knowingly or recklessly mislead the court.
68 See generally Geoffrey Marston, “Falsification of Documentary Evidence Before International
Tribunals: An Aspect of the Behring Sea Arbitration”, British Yearbook of International Law 71(1)
(2000): 357.
69 “International Courts and Tribunals, Evidence”, supra note 39, at [84]. The tribunal, for
instance, presumed official documents to be accurate.
70 Art. 6.1 states: “Counsel shall present evidence in a fair and reasonable manner and shall
refrain from presenting or otherwise relying upon evidence that he or she knows or has reason
to be believe to be false or misleading.” See also the Special Court for Lebanon’s Code of
Professional Conduct for Counsel Appearing Before the Tribunal, STL-CC-2011-01.
71 (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Albania), Judgment, ICJ Reports
1949, 4.
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international tribunal. While the ICJ rejected this line of argument and essen-
tially held that such a violation of Albanian sovereignty was a breach of inter-
national law, it stopped short of addressing the ancillary issue of whether the
evidence that had been obtained as a result of the operation was admissible
against Albania.
Just like in the case of Maritime Delimitation, the court’s silence in respect of
this issue is in no small part due to the fact that it did not have to rely on the
evidence in its decision (and Albania also did not lodge any objection to the
evidence), but at the same time, the court did not expressly exclude the evidence
concerning the mines either.72 This is plainly unsatisfactory, because while it is
an established principle in international law that no one is allowed to take
advantage of his own wrongdoing, “no general exclusionary rule of evidence
can be inferred from the judgment of the Court” in the Corfu Channel Case.73 The
corollary must be that illegally obtained evidence can be admitted, and possibly
relied upon in cases before the ICJ.74
But the principle that no one is allowed to take advantage of his own
wrongdoing is also widely recognised in domestic law. The violation of law in
the Corfu Channel Case was an international one – would the outcome be any
different if the violation is a domestic one? Since a violation of international law
is usually of greater gravity than a violation of domestic law, one would assume,
a fortiori, that evidence obtained in violation of a domestic law would be
admissible if the Corfu Channel Case is to be followed.75 In this regard, it is
interesting to note the decision by the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU) in Persia International Bank plc v Council of the European Union.76
72 The only comment in relation to evidence that the court made in passing was that even
though it was obligated “to consider the submissions of the party which appears, [the ICJ
Statute] does not compel the court to examine their accuracy in all their details; for this might…
prove impossible in practice”: Corfu Channel Case, id. at 248.
73 Evidence in International Litigation, supra note 48, at 178. The United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran Case (United States of America v Iran), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1980, 3
appears to be the only other PCIJ or ICJ case that could have involved the question of excluding
illegally obtained evidence, but Iran did not appear in the case.
74 Litigation at the International Court of Justice, supra note 12, at 385.
75 See also William Thomas Worster, “The Effect of Leaked Information on the Rules of
International Law”, American University International Law Review 28(2) (2013): 443, 464. It
should also be noted that the concept of crimen omnia ex se nata vitiate may be limited to
common law jurisdictions.
76 (2013) T-493/10. There is also the case of Prosecutor v Salim Jamil Ayyash, Case No STL-11-01/
T/TC (2015), which talks about whether leaked documents should be admissible on the grounds
of relevance and reliability.
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There, the applicant was alleged to have been involved in activities relating
to Iranian nuclear proliferation, and as a result it was subject to restrictive
measures implemented by the Council of the European Union. The applicant
pointed to diplomatic cables that had been made public through the Wikileaks
website revealing that certain European states were adopting restrictive mea-
sures against Iranian entities only because of pressure from the government of
the United States. The respondent argued that no weight should be given to the
cables as they were obtained in violation of various domestic laws. The court,
however, held that “since the applicant was not involved in the disclosure of the
diplomatic cables, the possibly unlawful nature of that disclosure cannot be
held against it.”77 One way to interpret this case, therefore, is that evidence
obtained in violation of domestic laws may be admissible in an international
tribunal if the party seeking to adduce the evidence was not the party that
committed the violation. Whether this is true for evidence obtained in violation
of international law remains an open question, at least as far as the ICJ is
concerned.
Comparison may also be drawn with the practice of international criminal
tribunals. For instance, r. 95 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY
states that evidence shall not be admissible “if obtained by methods which cast
substantial doubt on its reliability or if its admission is antithetical to, and
would seriously damage, the integrity of the proceedings.”78 This rule is mir-
rored in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTR, and expressed in
arguably broader terms in r. 95 of the Special Court for Sierra Leone Rules of
Procedure and Evidence: “No evidence shall be admitted if its admission would
bring the administration of justice into serious disrepute.”79 All of the aforesaid
rules are wide enough to cover various permutations of illegally obtained
evidence. What might account for the omission of an equivalent rule for the
ICJ? That international criminal tribunals deal exclusively with (serious) criminal
77 Persia International Bank plc v Council of European Union (2013) T-493/10, [95]. However,
while the court also noted the authenticity and credibility of the evidence, it did not think it was
probative of the allegation that the restrictive measures were put in place only because of
American pressure.
78 The draft of this rule provided that evidence through a violation of international human
rights would not be admissible. In Prosecutor v Brdanin (Radoslav), Case No IT-99-36-T (ICTY
2003), the trial chamber held that evidence obtained illegally (in this case, there were tran-
scripts of intercepted telephone conversations) was not a priori inadmissible, as the court had to
also consider the manner in which the evidence was obtained, the surrounding circumstances,
the reliability of the evidence, and the effect of its admission on the integrity of proceedings.
79 As amended 7 March 2003. See also Special Tribunal for Lebanon Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, STL-BD-2009-01-Rev.8, r. 162.
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charges? That international criminal tribunals do not handle inter-state disputes
but proceedings against individuals? That there is not as great a need to ensure
the legitimacy of the ICJ? That the regulation evidence is somehow not important
in ICJ proceedings? This is something we will revisit in the second part of this
article.
2.2.4 Evidence claimed to be confidential in nature
But even if evidence had not been obtained through illegal means – whether in
the sense of domestic or international law – there may be situations where
crucial evidence may be confidential, and in certain cases implicate state secrets
or national security and consequently, state sovereignty. That we have already
seen above in Persia International Bank plc (though one needs to bear in mind
that the mandate of the CJEU is very different from a court that hears only
disputes between states). The ICJ has actually considered a situation of con-
fidential evidence as well, but not in the context of a party seeking to adduce it
to the detriment of the other party.80 Instead, it was in the context of whether a
party or the court can compel the other party to adduce evidence that may
compromise state secrets, and whether highly redacted versions of such evi-
dence should be considered admissible.
In Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Bosnia and Herzegovina alleged that Serbia and Montenegro
had contributed to acts of genocide by failing to prevent and punish acts of
genocide during the Bosnian War.81 One of the arguments that Bosnia and
Herzegovina made was that the default burden of proof in proving the claim
should be reversed because Serbia and Montenegro had exclusive territorial
control of certain important and incriminating evidence. In addition, Bosnia
and Herzegovina only had access to highly redacted copies of documents of
the Supreme Defence Council of Serbia – classified as a military secret by the
Council of Ministers of Serbia and Montenegro – which could prove that there
was state control over one of the alleged massacres.
The ICJ denied the request to prohibit Serbia and Montenegro from using the
redacted documents, and also did not call upon Serbia and Montenegro to
80 See also Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube between Galatz and Braila
(1927) PCIJ Series B, No 14, 32, where the PCIJ declined admission of the history of articles of the
Versailles Treaty on the basis that they were confidential and had not been placed before the
court by the competent authority.
81 (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, 43.
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provide the non-redacted versions to Bosnia and Herzegovina.82 It justified its
decision by first pointing to the availability of other evidence that could have
proven the claims of Bosnia and Herzegovina,83 and secondly to the possibility
of drawing, pursuant to art. 49 of its statute, “its own conclusions” against a
party resisting disclosure in appropriate cases.84 But in so doing, the court
avoided, consciously or otherwise, the difficult question of the extent to which
a state can refuse disclosure of evidence by claiming confidentiality or the
protection of sovereign interests.85 In a related vein, it also passed on the
opportunity to clarify if evidence that may implicate an opposing state’s state
secrets or interests may be deemed inadmissible or excluded.
As to the first question, it has been noted that the court took a “progressive
step” in implying that art. 49 allows the court to draw adverse inferences against
the resisting party, as opposed to merely formally noting the refusal to produce
evidence.86 But the second question is the one that is of greater relevance here,
since the first relates more a ground for resisting disclosure87 and burden of
proof and standard of proof (when an adverse inference is drawn). On appear-
ance, it is similar to the aforementioned scenario of evidence obtained in
violation of a law, but it is conceivable that a state can come into possession
82 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, id.
at 129. In a dissenting opinion, the Vice-President noted that these documents were the best
possible evidence that would have shed light on the central issues in the dispute.
83 Cf Richard Joseph Goldstone and Rebecca Hamilton, “Bosnia v Serbia: Lessons from the
Encounter of the International Court of Justice with the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia”, Leiden Journal of International Law 21 (2008): 95, 108: “The un-redacted
documents were not available to Bosnia and Herzegovina from the ICTY because of a con-
fidentiality order imposed by the Tribunal at Serbia’s request.”
84 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
supra note 81, at 129.
85 “Bosnia v Serbia”, supra note 83, at 109–110. See also Prosecutor v Blaskic (Tihomir), Case
No IT-95-14 (ICTY 1997), [65]: “to grant States a blanket right to withhold, for security purposes,
documents necessary for trial might jeopardise the very function of the [ICTY]… [which] was
established for the prosecution of persons responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity
and genocide; these are crimes related to armed conflict and military operations. It is, therefore,
evident that military documents or other evidentiary material connected with military opera-
tions may be of crucial importance”.
86 Chittharanjan Felix Amerasinghe, “The Bosnia Genocide Case”, Leiden Journal of
International Law 21 (2008): 411, 422.
87 To be clear, the court in this case did not, as it also did not in the Corfu Channel Case,
characterise evidence that was withheld on the basis of national security or state secrets as the
invocation of privilege. However, the states that withheld evidence in these two cases were
effectively relying on privilege, and the ICJ also does not appear to distinguish between
inadmissibility and privilege: “Evidentiary Issues”, supra note 22, at 1242–1244.
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of another state’s confidential evidence, or evidence that may implicate another
state’s national interests, without violating any law (through the opposing
state’s accidental disclosure for instance). When this happens, on what ground
can the other state object to the adduction of the evidence? As it stands, there is
nothing in the law that creates this right. And it is precisely because ICJ seldom
ventures beyond what is necessary when explicating the law that a proper
framework for the admissibility and exclusion of evidence should be created.
2.2.5 Evidence that is privileged
Closely linked to the concept of confidential evidence is privileged evidence.
While the concepts overlap, they can also be quite different; for instance, in the
context of international litigation, evidence may be claimed to be confidential
because, as we just saw, it implicates state secrets or national security interests,
while evidence may be claimed to be privileged simply as a result of protecting
the attorney-client relationship (with the state being the client).88 It is also true
that privilege is conceptually very different from issues of admissibility; the
former is essentially about rights and immunities that exist because of policy
considerations (such as to promote uninhibited communication between attor-
ney and client), while the latter is more about the quality of the evidence,
generally evaluated in terms of relevance (in the broadest sense of the word)
and reliability. But what connects the two concepts is that of respecting and
protecting sovereign equality and sovereign prerogative. Indeed, the question
facing us is this: Does a state have any recourse under the current ICJ eviden-
tiary regime if another state has obtained evidence that the former may claim
privilege over, regardless of whether one considers privilege a ground of exclu-
sion in the strict sense or an aspect of immunity?
In Questions Relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and
Data, Australian intelligence officials had planted surveillance bugs in the
cabinet office of East Timor to gather information about the negotiations of a
treaty pertaining to sea and natural resources.89 East Timor launched a case at
the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) to pull out of the treaty when it learned
of this. Australia then raided the office of a lawyer in Canberra and took certain
documents; the lawyer was one of the counsel acting for East Timor in the PCA
proceedings. Australia claimed that the raid was necessitated by national
88 See also Michelle Grando, Evidence, Proof, and Fact-Finding in WTO Dispute Settlement
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 276–288.
89 (Timor-Leste v Australia), Provisional Measures, ICJ Reports 2014, 147.
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security interests. East Timor sought provisional measures from the ICJ pursuant
to art. 41 of the ICJ Statute, arguing that its preparations for the PCA proceedings
would be irreparably prejudiced if the privileged documents were not returned
immediately. In response, Australia made several undertakings not to misuse
the documents. Australia eventually returned the documents, but not before the
ICJ holding that Australia had to: ensure that the seized material would not be
used to the disadvantage of East Timor until the PCA proceedings had con-
cluded; keep under seal the seized material; and not interfere in any way in
communications between East Timor and its legal advisors in connection with
the PCA proceedings or any other related procedure.90
What may be made of this case for present purposes? First, while the bar for
obtaining provisional measures from the ICJ is not a very high one – the court
must be satisfied that the rights asserted by the requesting party are plausible, a
link exists between the rights and the measures sought, and there is a real and
imminent risk of irreparable prejudice91 – it seems odd that a party is unable to
rely on a rule of evidence and has to resort to what is essentially an injunction to
protect its basic rights. This is not to say that a rule should exist to the exclusion
of the availability of provisional measures since provisional measures serve a
variety of purposes and should be used when there are matters of urgency, but
that having a rule of some sort could have prevented parties from obtaining (and
subsequently adducing) evidence in breach of it in the first place. Having such a
rule also affects whether a party may be asked questions in relation to such
evidence. To prevent abuse, the court will have the discretion to examine the
evidence in camera, whether by itself or through another neutral third party. All
of this is generally consistent with the practice of certain international arbitral
tribunals that preside over disputes involving states, such as the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),92 though not so with others
such as the dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organisation.93 As it
were, in this case Australia was not even obligated to return the evidence it had
taken; it was simply presumed by the court that it would act in good faith and
not renege on the undertakings ordered. Nothing conclusive was said about
Australia’s reliance on national security considerations.
90 Questions Relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data, id. at
160–161. Three dissenting and two separate opinions were rendered, but the details of those
opinions need not concern us here.
91 Questions Relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data, id. at 153–155.
92 ICSID Convention Arbitration Rules (10 April 2006), Chapter IV. See also IBA Rules on the
Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration (2010), arts. 3 and 9.
93 “International Courts and Tribunals, Evidence”, supra note 39, at [81].
22 S. Chen
The other observation to be made is that this case involved a rather extreme
confluence of various facts, giving rise to a unique legal problem. Specifically, if
the evidence had only been obtained in violation of a law (whether domestic or
international), it could have fallen under the Corfu Channel Case analysis. If it
was only about stopping an opponent from using highly redacted material, it
could have fallen under the Genocide Convention analysis. Instead, this case was
about an opponent obtaining privileged documents through possibly illegal
means and whether something could be done to stop it from using those
documents – it was never made clear if the privileged documents would have
been used during the litigation, but regardless, the point is that no rule exists to
prevent a state from using another state’s privileged documents in ICJ litigation.
We thus return to the dilemma of whether this is a question of admissibility or
privilege, and the only thing that is clear is that there is nothing in the ICJ’s rules
or jurisprudence that addresses this gap. However, a resolution to the dilemma
may perhaps be found in the court’s established approach towards evidence of
prior settlement negotiations. Evidence in that context is inadmissible or
excluded not because the evidence has no probative value or is unreliable;
rather, as a matter of policy, such evidence should just not be considered
relevant to begin with.94 The same reasoning can be applied here, but the
exact mechanics for rejecting the admissibility of privileged evidence will be
considered in the second part of this article.
2.2.6 Expert evidence
Our survey of the ICJ’s jurisprudence concludes with the use of expert evidence.
In stark contrast to other possible grounds of exclusion covered thus far, there
are – as we have seen earlier – a number of provisions in the ICJ’s Statute, Rules
of Court, and Practice Directions that are related to the use of expert evidence.
However, none of them provide any guidance on the two main issues – issues
not unfamiliar in domestic litigation – that arise whenever there is expert
evidence adduced: first, whether the evidence should be admissible to begin
with; and secondly, how the expert evidence should be evaluated, especially
when there are conflicting accounts.
94 Indeed, when Sir James Fitzjames Stephen wrote the Indian Evidence Act which would later
be exported to more than a dozen British colonies, he considered evidence from settlement
negotiations not as privileged evidence, but irrelevant and inadmissible evidence. The position
remains the same today in Indian Evidence Act jurisdictions: see generally Chen Siyuan and
Lionel Leo, The Law of Evidence in Singapore (Singapore: Sweet & Maxwell, 2016), Chapter 8.
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Generally speaking, the resolution of the first issue depends on whether the
expert in question is reliable and whether his testimony is relevant to the issues
at hand, while the resolution of the second issue depends on whether the court
is qualified to properly appraise the expert evidence.95 Although recourse to
expert evidence has been rare in the ICJ’s practice,96 the recent case of Whaling
in the Antarctic saw the court attempt to clarify its approach in receiving expert
evidence.97 Previously, the court had never said anything concrete on this
matter, save that testimony from experts appointed by the court under art. 50
of its statute would be given great weight,98 while submissions from experts who
double-up as counsel would be given little weight as they are not subject to
cross-examination.99
In Whaling in the Antarctic, Australia alleged that Japan was using a scien-
tific research programme as a cover for commercial whaling in the Antarctic; in
the main, Australia pointed to the lack of research output relative to the number
of whales killed. Japan claimed that its actions were permitted under the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling.100 Experts were
appointed by the parties pursuant to arts. 57 and 64 of the ICJ’s Rules of
Court. Notably, one of Australia’s experts was a member of the Australian
government, while Japan refrained from appointing any of the Japanese scien-
tists involved in the programme as experts. This brought about the question of
whether it was appropriate to appoint an expert with a clearly vested interest in
the outcome. In a prior case, the ICJ had said that such witnesses would tend to
“identify himself with the interests of his country, and to be anxious when giving
evidence to say nothing which could prove adverse to its cause.”101 In this case,
however, the court appeared to criticise Japan for not putting forth expert
witnesses to explain certain aspects of its supposed research programme.102
95 Lucas Carlos Lima, “The Evidential Weight of Experts Before the ICJ: Reflections on The
Whaling in the Antarctic Case”, Journal of International Dispute Settlement 6 (2015): 621, 622–626.
96 “The Evidential Weight of Experts Before the ICJ”, id. at 623.
97 (Australia v Japan: New Zealand intervening), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2014, 226.
98 Corfu Channel Case, supra note 71, at 21.
99 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, supra note 10, at 72. In comparison, advice rendered by
internal unofficial experts after the oral proceedings have concluded have indeterminate weight
as not much has been disclosed about how such experts are consulted.
100 (2 December 1946) 161 UNTS 1716.
101 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note
39, at 43. The court did note, however, two special features of this case. First, one of the parties
was not appearing before the court, and secondly, the case involved in litigation relating to
armed conflict.
102 “The Evidential Weight of Experts Before the ICJ”, supra note 95, at 631–632.
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As to the evaluation of the expert evidence, the court in Whaling in the
Antarctic did not expressly identify any general criteria with respect to evidential
weight or how competing accounts would be resolved. On the contrary, it openly
expressed a strong preference for the experts to come to a consensus on all of
the major issues, and appeared ready to accept any uncontested opinions.103
The court also did not deviate from its previous practice of refusing to resolve
any clashes in expert opinions.104 Unsurprisingly, this approach has been criti-
cised before: the search for the truth and the search for consensus are not paths
that always converge, and the court should not adopt a totally hands-off
approach, especially when the evidence is pivotal to the resolution of central
issues in the dispute.105 Just as unsurprising is that this area of law has been
criticised by even the court’s own judges106 and is being strongly advocated for
reform.107
3 Whether a more principled approach regarding
the court’s framework for admission
and exclusion of evidence is plausible
We now come to the second part of the article. The survey above makes it clear
that the case law of the ICJ is consistent with the court’s rules: there is no
requirement of relevance as parties are free to admit anything as evidence, and
save for the ground of prior settlement negotiations, no exclusionary rules or
judicial discretion to exclude evidence exist; it is only after all of the evidence
have been admitted that the court’s function to evaluate and weigh the evidence
based on its reliability and value is engaged.108 But even in discharging that
103 Whaling in the Antarctic, supra note 97, at 283–293.
104 Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pula Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South
Ledge (Malaysia v Singapore), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2008, 12, 59–60.
105 “The Evidential Weight of Experts Before the ICJ”, supra note 95, at 633.
106 See for instance Bruno Simma, “The International Court of Justice and Scientific
Expertise”, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 106
(2012): 230, 230–232.
107 James Gerard Devaney, Fact-Finding Before the International Court of Justice (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2016).
108 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v Uganda), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2005, 168, 200–201; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, supra note 10, at 72. See also Keith Highet, “Evidence, the
Court, and The Nicaragua Case”, American Journal of International Law 81 (1987): 1, 9; Kenneth
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function, the ICJ “recognises no formal or other rigid rules as to its assessment of
evidence or the relative weight to be given to evidence in any particular cate-
gory. It possesses a wide margin of discretion in the matter, and that discretion
is limited only by the prohibition against arbitrary action.”109 Ultimately, the ICJ
sees itself as being accountable only to the parties appearing before it,110 and
would normally avoid to “attempt a determination of the overall factual situa-
tion [of the case] and would limit itself to ‘make such findings of fact as are
necessary’ so that it can respond to the submissions of the parties.”111 But
should something be done about its lack of a framework to exclude evidence,
or is the ICJ a sui generis entity that obviates the need for clear principles
delineating its exclusionary discretion?
3.1 Whether particular features of the ICJ truly sets
it apart from other tribunals
There are certainly features of the World Court that immediately distinguishes it
from a domestic court, especially one that applies the common law (where there
is a far greater emphasis on having rules to regulate the admissibility and
exclusion of evidence). To begin with, the ICJ is a court for settling disputes
between sovereign states, as opposed to a dispute between two civil parties or a
dispute between the state and an accused person. The assumption then is that
before the ICJ, the opposing states will always be at arms’ length, be it in terms
of representation or resourcefulness. What also follows is that parties would be
assumed to act in good faith, and in any event, it is not in their own interests to
submit evidence that are of questionable worth. Ultimately, there is great respect
for sovereign equality – the bedrock of public international law – and as a
Keith, “The International Court of Justice and Criminal Justice”, International and Comparative
Law Quarterly 59(4) (2010): 895, 905; Katherine Del Mar, “Weight of Evidence Generated
Through Intra-Institutional Fact-Finding Before the International Court of Justice”, Journal of
International Dispute Settlement 2 (2011): 393, 396.
109 The International Court of Justice, supra note 7, at Chapter VI(2)(b). See also Case
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 39, at 39–41.
110 See for instance Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, 12, 138: “the court has
a passive role… The parties put forward facts and submit the evidence that they consider
favourable to their claims, and the court takes them into consideration when making its
decision. That is perfectly logical, because the purpose of the judgment is to decide as between
the parties”.
111 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo, supra note 108, at 200.
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consequence, the concept of what constitutes a fair trial as regards matters of
evidence is affected, in that a paternalistic approach to regulation at the admis-
sibility phase is eschewed.112 The court’s jurisdiction being dependent on the
parties’ consent also means that party autonomy, including in matters of evi-
dence, is given primacy; put another way, if there are too many complex rules of
evidence, parties may be discouraged from accepting the court’s jurisdiction.113
In these respects, the ICJ is unique, because most other international tribunals
do not involve only states as parties across the aisle.
It is also important to note that the ICJ does not quite use a typical trial
process for fact-finding since the court hears and decides questions of fact and
law alike with no jury in the equation; further, as seen in its statute, rules of
court, and practice directions, evidence comes in three main forms: expert
testimony, witness testimony, and documents (but seldom affidavits), but
given the nature of most litigation before the ICJ, documentary evidence
assumes the most important role.114 If the production of evidence is out of
time, the opponent can object to its admission or the court can reject the
evidence, and the court has an inquisitorial role in that it can question the
witness directly or require parties to answer questions relating to the evidence,
but otherwise much is left to the parties to decide what evidence to adduce to
prove their case. Indeed, because the court also cannot directly compel the
production of evidence,115 it often relies on the parties to come up with a
compromis containing agreed facts.116 Thus, key evidentiary tools often asso-
ciated with common law adjudication (discovery and cross-examination) and
civil law adjudication (judge-led proceedings) recede in importance for proceed-
ings before the ICJ: the evidence is not rigorously tested by either the parties or
the court, but simply analysed (by the court) after all of the evidence have been
put in.117
112 “International Courts and Tribunals, Evidence”, supra note 39, at [8].
113 “International Courts and Tribunals, Evidence”, id. at [8]–[10].
114 Evidence Before the International Court of Justice, supra note 12, at 231. State have also
successfully adduced maps, photographs, models, and media: see for instance Fisheries Case
(United Kingdom v Norway), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1951, 116; Case Concerning the Temple of
Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1962, 6; Continental Shelf (Tunisia v
Libya Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1982, 18.
115 As seen in our survey of its rules, however, it can request parties to provide documents, call
witnesses and experts on its own accord, and conduct site visits.
116 Litigation at the International Court of Justice, supra note 12, at 439–441.
117 See also Litigation at the International Court of Justice, supra note 12, at 383: “the Court has
always made a conscientious effort to develop its own system of evidence, taking elements from
different systems of law, without fully aligning itself with any of them.”
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In contrast, exclusionary rules were conceptualised with certain character-
istics in mind that are simply not found in the ICJ: a common law, adversarial
system; jury (for which traditional exclusionary rules were designed for) rather
than bench trials; criminal rather than civil proceedings (or at least they are
applied less rigorously in the latter); and the machinery of the state against
vulnerable persons, rather than state versus state.118 And it is not just domestic
law systems that the ICJ stands in contrast with; apart from status of parties, the
ICJ is also different from international criminal courts, international human
rights courts, regional appellate courts, and international arbitration tribunals
given the extremely broad range of subject matter it has purview over – it
presides over, amongst others, commercial disputes, human rights claims, and
even criminal claims. But at least four counterpoints may be made in response to
an over-emphasis on the ICJ’s supposed sui generis character.
First, serious limitations with the court’s lack of exclusionary rules or an
exclusionary discretion have been identified through a series of cases which we
have just seen above. It is axiomatic that for any judgment to have legitimacy,
the evidential foundations must be strong, and concomitantly, there should at
least be some mechanisms to sieve out problematic evidence at an early stage;
doing so also saves the court and parties the unnecessary waste of time and
resources.119 Why should all of this be less true for the World Court, even
though (or just because) it does not deal exclusively with criminal matters and
parties are presumed to be of equal footing? In the days of the PCIJ, questions
of evidence and disputes of fact did not really arise as the disputes revolved
predominantly around legal questions such as the application of treaties.120
But times have changed dramatically. Apart from the cases we surveyed above
showing the problems when there are no exclusionary grounds, the modern
dispute brought before the ICJ tends to involve complex and voluminous
amounts of evidence and fact-finding is no longer a straightforward exercise.121
It stands to reason to have some filtering mechanism in place. If the objection
is to preserve the principle of free admissibility and the admissibility-weight
divide, no alternative to improving the current evidentiary regime within those
confines appears to have been offered. Further, as the practice of the ICC has
shown, exclusionary rules do not exist just to protect accused persons who are
presumptively vulnerable. The sanctions that were meted out against the
118 See generally Evidence and the Litigation Process, supra note 52, at Chapter 1.
119 See Evidence in International Litigation, supra note 48, at 33.
120 Litigation at the International Court of Justice, supra note 12, at 384.
121 Litigation at the International Court of Justice, id. at 382–387.
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witnesses were perjured were against witnesses of the accused person, and not
the prosecution.
Secondly, as we have also seen above, there is no lack of guidance from
other international tribunals as to how certain exclusionary rules may be
expressed, and how they may help ensure fairer outcomes in certain cases.
Indeed, while it has often been said that evidentiary regimes in the international
plane are generally liberal because this presents the best compromise between
civil and common law traditions, it is misleading to collapse all types of inter-
national tribunals into a monolithic entity. For instance, it might make sense,
from an equalisation perspective, for a human rights tribunal to have a liberal
admissibility regime because for such a tribunal it is always the individual suing
the state, rather than an individual being criminally charged by an international
apparatus.122 In the human rights context, an individual is much less disposed
to find incriminating evidence against the state than the other way round.
A blanket principle that all international tribunals have no strict rules on
evidence does not stand up to critical scrutiny. That certain international tribu-
nals have taken steps to sieve out or at least address problematic evidence only
fortifies this point.
Thirdly, in municipal legal systems, appellate courts exist to correct the
indecisions made by the courts of first instance, be it in matters of law or matters
of discretion (and evidence law falls under both). For the ICJ, there is no system
of appeal. Any decision rendered is final and binding. Having rules may be seen
as an impediment or as favouring a system over another, but the better view may
be to treat such rules as being potentially helpful in promoting accuracy and
legitimacy in decision-making. This is all the more so when the matter is tried
only once and there is no possibility of correction by a superior tribunal.
Finally, it may be said that the ICJ’s evidentiary practice over the years is
actually conducive to an adoption of some kind of framework or mechanism to
better regulate the admissibility or exclusion of evidence.123 Consider the
122 Part of this, of course, is also borne out of necessity. For instance, under the individual
communications complaints mechanism for the Human Rights Committee, there is a pre-
requisite of exhaustion of local remedies. This pre-requisite means that all relevant findings
of fact would already have been made by the domestic courts. However, this does not mean that
absolutely no issues of evidence (admissibility and exclusion specifically) would arise at the
international phase. Questions of evidence may also arise in an indirect way in the context of
the European Court of Human Rights. For instance, whether an applicant had received a fair
trial for the purposes of art. 6 of the European Convention for Human Rights (1950) ETS 5 would
depend on whether the rules of evidence were breached in accordance with the domestic law in
question.
123 See also Litigation at the International Court of Justice, supra note 12, at 383.
Re-assessing the Evidentiary Regime of the ICJ 29
following propositions that the ICJ have come up with in respect of issues that,
upon reflection, may not necessarily fall neatly on either side of the perceived
divide between admissibility and weight:124
(a) Hearsay evidence is given little or no weight;125 contemporaneous evidence
from persons with direct knowledge of the facts on the ground is
preferred.126
(b) Save for the testimony of experts, opinion evidence is given little or no
weight.127
(c) Evidence of disinterested witnesses is preferred.128
(d) Evidence that is uncontested, against one’s own interests, or that acknowl-
edges facts or conduct unfavourable to the state represented by the person
offering the evidence are given more weight.129
(e) Evidence emanating from official sources is preferred;130 where interna-
tional organisations, particularly UN bodies, have made findings of fact
elsewhere, such findings would not be lightly disturbed.131
(f) Evidence emanating from a single source is treated with caution.132
(g) Evidence that may not directly prove the facts alleged may nonetheless be
considered as material that is corroborative or circumstantial.133
(h) Direct evidence is preferred, but liberal reliance on circumstantial evidence
is permitted if the direct evidence is under the exclusive control of the
124 See also Ho Hock Lai, A Philosophy of Evidence Law: Justice in the Search for Truth (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008), 256–259 and 311–314 as to why international tribunals appear to
dispense with exclusionary rules but in practice apply them through the device of weight.
125 Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Albania),
Judgment, ICJ Reports 1949, 4, 17; Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua, supra note 39, at 42.
126 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo, supra note 108, at 201.
127 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note
39, at 42.
128 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, id. at 49.
129 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, id. at 49, 61.
130 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, 136, 141–146; Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 81, at 135.
131 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo, supra note 108, at 206–237. Cf
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2010, 403.
132 Oil Platforms, supra note 11, at 190; Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of,
supra note 108, at 200–201.
133 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note
39, at 40.
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opposing party and the circumstantial evidence is not contradicted by
available direct evidence or accepted facts.134
(i) Documents that are not part of a publication readily available will likely be
rejected.135
(j) Judicial notice may be taken of matters of public knowledge, such as
matters that have received extensive coverage in the world.136
Notably, none of these points would look out of place in a common law system,
despite the ICJ’s apparent embracement of the civil law tradition of not having
any exclusionary rules. There is a clear preference for the most reliable evidence,
and such evidence must also have some degree of relevance. Yet, without a
proper framework to assist the court as to when evidence can be admitted or
should be excluded from the outset, one witnesses a phenomenon not unfami-
liar in jurisdictions that apply exclusionary rules to its system of evidence law
and also do not have juries as fact-finders: when exclusionary rules are difficult
or inconvenient to apply, such rules are circumvented by re-characterising the
problematic evidence as potentially useful evidence (for instance, circumstantial
evidence); after the evidence has been admitted and the full context of events
apprised of, the court can later adjust the weight of the evidence if need be.137
This, in effect, is really no different from the ICJ bifurcating the regulation of
evidence into admissibility (where there are no exclusionary rules and parties
are free to submit whatever they wish, subject to timely filing and objections
from their opponents) and appreciation (the court would evaluate whether
the claims are properly proven by assigning the appropriate weight to the
evidence).138
But in view of the cases that we have seen in this article, the ICJ is presented
with two choices going forward. The first is to preserve the status quo and
change nothing. This means that while evidence from prior settlement negotia-
tions continues to be inadmissible by virtue of the established jurisprudence, the
court will not and cannot do anything about a party attempting to adduce
evidence that is forged, evidence that is obtained from a violation of domestic
or international law, evidence that may reveal state secrets, or evidence that
134 Corfu Channel Case, supra note 71, at 18–32; Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 81, at 130–131.
135 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v Colombia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2012,
624, 632.
136 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran Case, supra note 73, at 10.
137 See generally The Law of Evidence in Singapore, supra note 94, at Chapter 2.
138 See also Litigation at the International Court of Justice, supra note 12, at 385–386.
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may be privileged. In addition, the court will continue to place no restrictions on
what qualifies as expert evidence, and will not attempt to resolve conflicting
expert evidence either. And these issues are just based on the state of the law
today – new cases down the road would only introduce other categories of
problematic evidence which the court has to grapple with. The second choice
is to attempt to take steps to ensure as much as possible that situations such as
those just mentioned (and maybe even new ones) do not arise. Naturally, one
may ask: is it really necessary to change the existing system, and even if it is
necessary, how should the change look like?
3.2 Making the case for codifying the ICJ’s exclusionary
discretion
A legal system “without rules of evidence altogether”, and one which relies on
“fact-finders to give relevant evidence, in whatever form, the weight it
deserves”, has been described as a utopian ideal that may be incompatible
with reality.139 Such a system presupposes the existence of a near-perfect fact-
finder, but at the same time also ignores important notions such as fairness and
due process which are integral to adjudication. Proponents of freedom of admis-
sibility may indeed feel very confident about the abilities of ICJ judges in
evaluating all manner of evidence, however tainted it may be. But at the end
of the day, it is not just about professional ability, but also about the image the
court seeks to project. On a basic level, the court surely would desire its
judgments to be built on the most robust of evidential (and legal) foundations.
Yet this must be the function of any given court, whether domestic or interna-
tional. This it can, arguably, achieve with or without exclusionary rules or an
exclusionary discretion. It is on the aspiratory level that one must decide if the
ICJ, given its unique and vantage position as an apex resolver of inter-state
disputes, should have anything to say about its moral legitimacy and concern
with integrity of proceedings as well.140
To illustrate, the objection to admitting evidence that in its obtainment had
violated domestic or international law, state confidentiality, or privilege is not so
139 Paul Roberts and Adrian Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2010), vi. While Robin Auld wrote this with respect to criminal evidence, for the reasons that
follow, it may still be important to reject certain types of evidence from being admitted.
140 In other words, while the current ICJ evidentiary regime is similar to Jeremy Bentham’s
Natural System of Procedure, it seems to fail to take into account evidentiary rules with non-
epistemic significance or assumes that rectitude of decision is the solitary aim of the court.
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much that such evidence does not help the court in its quest to find the truth
and reach a factually just outcome. Such evidence may well be highly probative
and even highly reliable. However, admitting them freely is tantamount to a
court endorsing a flagrant disregard for due process and maybe even encoura-
ging impunity. Furthermore, there are strong practical reasons for rejecting or
excluding problematic evidence from the outset. As we have seen from the
survey of the ICJ cases, evidence improperly obtained has the potential to
cause great damage or even violate another state’s rights, or at the very least
unnecessarily protract proceedings. Some of these violations also have the
potential to cause irreversible harm, for instance when state secrets are com-
promised or when privileged documents are stolen. Without any rules, practice,
or jurisprudence to prevent, deter, or sanction bad practices in the admission of
evidence, states are given a free pass to push the limits of acceptability. In the
Corfu Channel Case, the United Kingdom believed it had free rein to obtain
evidence for the purposes of presenting it to an international tribunal. It violated
the territorial integrity of another state in doing so. In Maritime Delimitation,
Qatar did not think there was any harm in submitting what were probably forged
documents. It is deeply ironic that the current evidentiary system which pro-
motes maximum freedom to adduce evidence does as much harm to the states’
sovereign interests as it claims to respect.
Thus, taking into account the current gaps in the ICJ’s framework for
admission and exclusion of evidence and the practices of other international
tribunals, it is proposed that the ICJ could adopt,141 at least as a start, a general
provision pertaining to the court’s exclusionary discretion as part of its frame-
work. This new provision would state:
The court has the discretion to exclude any evidence sought to be admitted. This discretion
may be exercised even if the party whom the evidence is brought against does not raise
any objections to the admissibility of the evidence in question. In exercising this discre-
tion, the court shall consider not only the relevance, materiality, and reliability of the
evidence but also its actual or potential prejudicial effect if it is admitted. Prejudicial effect
includes, but is not limited to, a violation of another state’s rights, the obfuscation of
issues,142 and the wasting of time. In exercising the discretion, the court shall also consider
the need to ensure integrity and fairness in the proceedings.
141 Arts. 69 and 70 govern amendments made to the ICJ Statute. Alternatively, this rule may be
included in the court’s Rules of Court, which is probably the path of less (political) resistance
and for which the applicability of the rules is in all likelihood not lessened.
142 The phrase “obfuscation of issues” may be of concern if one views this as requiring the
court to examine the substance of the evidence, in that the distinction between the procedural
examination of admissibility of a piece of evidence and the substantive examination of the
value of or weight given to that evidence becomes thin. The concept of obfuscation in this
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Four inter-related considerations guided the formulation of this provision. The
first is that the aim of the ICJ should not just be rectitude of decision, though it is
obviously important; its adjudication process should be informed by non-
epistemic factors such as legitimacy and accountability as well. Accordingly,
the relevance, materiality, and reliability of a piece of evidence may not be
necessary and sufficient conditions for its admissibility, though the principle
of free admissibility of evidence is still largely preserved as this rule is discre-
tionary. In other words, this discretion does not act strictly as an admissibility
gateway or prescribe admissibility conditions, in that it may be exercised at
any point, though in practice it is likely to be used as a residual power so that
the court can be apprised of as much evidence as possible before deciding if a
certain piece or certain pieces of evidence should be excluded.
Secondly, rather than exhaustively list discrete categories of evidence that
may be excluded, it may simply help to be more flexible by providing the court a
broad (but not pointlessly wide) discretion. This is also more consistent with the
current evidentiary regime (which is generally flexible and does not have fixed
rules or exceptions, and reflects both civil and common law traditions); nuances
of this discretion can be developed jurisprudentially in any event.143
Thirdly, the nature of this exclusionary discretion means that the court’s role
in respect of admitting evidence is not to be confined to the post-admissibility
phase of merely determining the weight of the evidence. It is meant to prompt
the court to be more proactive in sieving out undesirable evidence, and acts as a
means to encourage the court to be more accountable insofar as it is compelled
to apply its mind to contested questions of evidence, especially in its written
judgments. It is also designed to cover situations where a state may fail to raise
an objection about admissibility, as it should not always be assumed, without
exception, that parties would truly be at arms’ length. If there is a concern that
context may perhaps be compared with abuse of the court’s process. The introduction of
evidence that appears designed to vex, embarrass, or scandalise the other party will not fall
under the limb of “obfuscation of issues”, but probably under the limb of “wasting of time”.
What may fall more neatly under obfuscation of issues may, for instance, be evidence that
clearly confuses or distracts the tribunal. Suppose a dispute is about whether a state had
committed an illegal cyberattack against another state. The accusing state, in an attempt to
establish motive, tries to adduce evidence relating to the accused state’s human rights track
record to show that the attack was possibly a retaliation against the accusing state’s previous
criticism of the accused state. On its face, such evidence should be considered extraneous to the
issues at hand and an obfuscation.
143 The growth of the jurisprudence depends on the court’s elaborations in its written judg-
ments on how the discretion is invoked. As the jurisprudence develops, it is hoped that states
would take the cue and be more selective in the admission of their evidence.
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this discretion may encourage parties to lodge vexatious applications to contest
admissibility at every turn, this may be solved by developing a pre-trial mechan-
ism for resolving key evidential disputes; in any event, the nature of any
discretion is that there is a choice not to exercise it for or against any party.
Finally, it is preferable that an exclusionary discretion is clearly delineated
in statutory law. The alternative to codification would be to rely on the court’s
inherent powers or inherent jurisdiction, but this is undesirable for various
reasons, ranging from unnecessary uncertainty in the grounds and scope of
application of the power or jurisdiction, to the normative justification for such
an exercise.144 Moreover, the invocation of inherent powers is, by definition,
reserved for highly exceptional situations. While leaving it to the courts to
develop the contours of its inherent powers may seem more consistent with
the ICJ’s subscription to the principle of free admissibility of evidence, as we
have seen in the jurisprudential survey, the better way forward may be to
crystallise a clear rule for the court to apply and for the parties to follow, than
to wait for even more unjust outcomes – as mentioned, the judicial development
of a power is not inconsistent with the statutory provision of one.
To be clear, no claim of absolute originality is made of this proposed
provision; similar provisions with varying elements are already found in the
rules of procedure and evidence of other international tribunals that run the full
spectrum, such as the PCA,145 ICTY,146 ICC,147 and ICSID,148 as well as various
domestic evidence statutes.149 All of these provisions essentially require the
tribunal, in determining whether to admit or exclude a piece of evidence, to
make a balancing assessment based on all the circumstances of the case, but the
144 See generally Chen Siyuan, “Is the Invocation of Inherent Jurisdiction the Same as the
Exercise of Inherent Powers?”, International Journal of Evidence & Proof 17(4) (2013): 367.
145 Permanent Court of Arbitration Arbitration Rules (17 December 2012), r. 27. See also
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Internal Rules (Rev. 9, January 2015), r. 87.
146 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal of the Former
Yugoslavia UN Doc IT/32/Rev3, 30 January 1995, r. 89(D). However, it is interesting to note that
the ICTR and the Special Court for Sierra Leone do not have equivalent provisions in their rules,
but the Special Tribunal for Lebanon does (r. 149 of its Rules of Procedure and Evidence).
147 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc PCNICC/
2000/1/Add.1, rr. 63 and 73.
148 International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes Convention Arbitration
Rules (10 April 2006), r. 34(1). See also International Bar Association Rules on the Taking of
Evidence in International Arbitration (2010), art. 9, which establishes that an arbitral tribunal
may exclude a document from evidence on grounds of special political or institutional
sensitivity.
149 See for instance s. 135 of Australia’s Evidence Act 1995, s. 8 of New Zealand’s Evidence Act
2006, or r. 403 of the United States’ Federal Rules of Evidence.
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proposed provision tries to take into account the particular characteristics of the
ICJ and its general approach to matters of evidence discussed above. Further,
while it is accepted that such a balancing test is not a perfect mechanism,150
when it is applied to the different fact situations of the ICJ cases surveyed earlier,
it would seem to prevent or solve most of the problems that were identified:
(a) Evidence that is forged or falsified is definitely unreliable and also affects
the integrity fairness of the proceedings if admitted. Of course, a mere
general exclusionary provision is not going to prevent or deter all attempts
at forgery or falsification – some authentication process is required when
the evidence is challenged, and sanctions may also be needed – but at
least the court can now exclude such evidence completely instead of giving
allegedly or even clearly falsified information ambiguous weight in its
written judgments.
(b) Evidence that is obtained through a violation of law, regardless of whether
the violation is that of a domestic or international law, will probably not
pass muster under this test. The prejudicial effect of the violation may
depend on, amongst other factors, the nature of the illegality and the
violation (and extent of it) of the opposing state’s rights, while the integrity
or fairness of proceedings may depend on the complicity in illegality of the
state seeking to adduce the evidence. Having said that, a violation of a
domestic law is arguably not a matter that should concern the ICJ, since it
is only permitted to determine whether violations of international law have
occurred.
(c) Evidence that implicates an opposing state’s interests, for instance in the
form of confidential information or privileged communications, will likely
be excluded, especially if it was obtained in violation of a law. Again, the
objection to the admissibility of such evidence may not necessarily be
based on a lack of probative value or reliability, but is instead based on
policy considerations such as the preservation of integrity and fairness of
proceedings. The proposed exclusionary discretion is also phrased in a way
that avoids the dilemma of whether to characterise privilege as an immu-
nity issue or as an exclusionary issue. However, the counterpoint of
whether states may resist disclosure with blanket assertions of state secrets
needs to be considered. This may be solved in part by the drawing of
adverse inferences.
150 For the criticisms of the balancing test, see generally Ian Dennis, The Law of Evidence
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2013), Chapter 2. Issues include the practical difficulty of trying to
balance probative value and prejudicial effect and identifying the normative justification for
excluding relevant evidence.
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(d) For experts appointed by the parties, the court should be mindful of the
experts’ credentials and whether there are any conflicts of interest.
Presumably, experts appointed by the court would not run into these
issues. It is of course accepted that the exclusionary discretion does not
usually provide a resolution to the problem of conflicting expert witnesses,
because that problem is mostly solved either before the evidence is
admitted (for instance, through some sort of pre-hearing “hot-tubbing”
process where points of consensus and departure are identified) or after
the evidence has been admitted (where the court would need to evaluate
the evidence in the light of its internal and external consistencies). Indeed,
coming up with a framework for resolving conflicting expert evidence
would require the endeavour of another article altogether. Nonetheless,
the exclusionary discretion can still be useful in sieving out clearly unreli-
able expert opinion and forces parties to put forth only the most relevant
and reliable experts; this is preferable to the court expressing no view on
conflicting expert opinion as it cannot detect any consensus.
(e) For completeness, while already an established ground of exclusion
under the court’s case law, evidence from prior settlement negotiations
will be excludable under this provision as well as such evidence is always
going to be sufficiently prejudicial, regardless of whether it evinces some
sort of admission of liability. It is also irrelevant and as a matter of policy,
permitting its admissibility may discourage amicable settlement of dis-
putes. Finally, while evidence that is filed out of time is already covered
by existing rules,151 the considerations set out in this provision may be
used by the court in deciding whether to make an exception in allowing
admissibility, instead of relying solely on whether there is an objection
filed by the opposing state.
Alternatively, if a more categorical approach in formulating the discretion and a
different normative justification for the discretion is preferred, the provision
could look like this:
Notwithstanding its relevance, the Court may, at the request of a party or on its own
motion, exclude from evidence or production any document, statement, or oral testimony
for any of the following reasons:
a. A lack of reliability or authenticity;152
b. The obtainment of evidence is tainted by an international illegality;
151 As mentioned above, by rules such as art. 52 of the ICJ Statute.
152 Alternatively, the factor of authenticity may be replaced with less nuanced language, along
the lines of fabricated evidence.
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c. Grounds of privilege or confidentiality that the Court determines to be compelling; and
d. Grounds of political sensitivity that the Court determines to be compelling.
Certain features of this alternative formulation deserve further elucidation.
First, ground (b) clarifies that only an international wrong will give rise to
reason for the ICJ to exclude evidence. It also disregards the factor of
whether the party seeking to adduce the illegally obtained evidence did in
fact have a role to play in that illegality – the legitimacy of the ICJ would
suffer if its decision was founded on evidence obtained in violation of
international law.
Secondly, ground (c) is meant to apply where evidence sought to be
admitted implicates an opposing state’s interests, such as when admissibility
of such evidence would lead to a divulgence of confidential state secrets, or
when such evidence relates to privileged attorney-client communications. This
avoids two quandaries: parties are no longer faced with the dilemma of whether
to characterise privilege as an immunity or exclusionary issue, while the cou-
pling of privilege and confidentiality exempts the court and parties from having
to go through the exercise of having to determine which of the two closely
related concepts is at play.153
Thirdly, ground (d), which is not found in the general formulation of the
discretion, may be invoked on the rare occasion where a particular piece of
evidence does not engage any of the other sub-sections, but the court has reason
to exclude such evidence out of respect for state sovereignty, or the need to
ensure that states will continue to consent to the jurisdiction of the ICJ for the
resolution of inter-state disputes.154
Fourthly, the inclusion of the requirement that the court must find a com-
pelling reason to exclude evidence for grounds (c) and (d) emphasises that the
court has to undertake a balancing assessment when excluding evidence on
such grounds. The flexibility accorded to the court in undertaking such an
assessment is consistent with the current evidentiary regime, and the meaning
of the term “compelling” can be developed jurisprudentially. The high threshold
required to exclude evidence on privilege, confidentiality or sensitivity grounds
also provides the court with an instrument to ward against the potential deluge
of unmeritorious applications to exclude evidence.
153 See generally Evidence Before the International Court of Justice, supra note 12, at Chapter 6.
154 See also Evidence Before the International Court of Justice, id. at 20–21; art. 36 of the ICJ
Statute. For instance, this ground may be invoked when evidence was obtained through
espionage, which at this point does not appear to amount to an international wrong but may
be in violation of domestic laws.
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Finally, this proposed formulation omits the consideration of whether the
evidence damages, or is antithetical to the fairness or integrity of the proceed-
ings. In this respect it distinguishes itself from international tribunals whose
exclusive remit is criminal law and focuses on equality of arms instead of the
apparent protection of a party. All things considered, this alternative version is
inherently less flexible than the primary version, but notably, regardless of
which formulation is applied to the cases we had surveyed earlier, the conclu-
sions (of preventing the said problems as identified in the survey of ICJ cases
from arising) are the same.
4 Conclusion
The ICJ, as the principal judicial organ of the UN, bears a heavy mandate. The
continued legitimisation of public international law is a constant project-in-
progress, and depends in large part on the defensibility of the judgments
delivered by a tribunal that is in a particularly unique position presiding over
inter-state disputes involving a broad spectrum of issues. On matters of proce-
dure and substance, the law is fairly established, or the very least discernible.
On matters of evidence, however, parties appearing before the court have
virtually no guidance despite the upward trend of more and more voluminous
evidence being submitted to the court. Though the ICJ has had a longstanding
practice in applying the freedom of admissibility of evidence and it prefers to
analyse issues of evidence as a matter of weight, this article has sought to
demonstrate that certain critical gaps in adopting this approach exist – a situa-
tion exacerbated by first, the virtual lack of exclusionary rules and an exclu-
sionary discretion and secondly, the shift in focus of disputes before the court
from mere treaty interpretation to conflicts requiring judicial evaluations of
complex factual matrices. The gaps identified in this article with respect to the
court’s admissibility framework include actual scenarios where the ICJ had been
placed in a difficult spot in the face of evidence that was fabricated by a party,
evidence that was illegally obtained by a party, privileged evidence that was
stolen by a party, and evidence that saw no consensus reached by opposing
expert witnesses appointed by the parties. In all those scenarios, the court was
either unwilling or unable to address the evidential issues and this is plainly
unsatisfactory.
In this article, I have tried to show that the proposed introduction of a
judicial discretion to exclude evidence in the court’s rules is a small but impor-
tant step in closing these gaps and obviating the aforementioned scenarios,
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enhancing the ICJ’s accountability and legitimacy, and protecting the rights of
states. The proposed discretion complements, rather than impedes, the court’s
predominant concerns of respecting sovereign rights and equality and rectitude
of decision. While it remains important to recognise the philosophy and special
features of the court, the better way forward is not to simply keep insisting on
the rights of sovereign states and expecting them to be wholly responsible for
deciding what should be presented as proper evidence before the ICJ. Many
international tribunals have, over the years, gradually recognised the need for
the adjudicators to play an active role or at least have a role in sieving our
problematic evidence either at the outset or at the residual stage, and they have
achieved this through the integration of discretions similar to the one proposed
here into their procedural and evidential rules, the introduction of guidelines for
best practices for parties and counsel, sanctions for those attempting to mislead
the court, or a combination of these measures. These international tribunals,
often also representing both civil and common law traditions, no longer view
exclusionary rules or an exclusionary discretion as unique to particular munici-
pal legal systems. The time is ripe for the ICJ to start doing the same, and it is
hoped that this article is of some contribution in paving the way.
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